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Abstract: Pay gaps for women and minorities have persisted after accounting for
observable differences. Why? If employers can access applicants’ salary histories
while bargaining over wages, they can take advantage of past inequities,
perpetuating inequality. Recently, a dozen US states have banned employer
access to salary histories. We analyze the effects of these salary history bans
(SHBs) on employer wage posting and pay in a difference-in-differences design.
Following SHBs, employers posted wages more often and increased pay for job
changers, particularly for women (6.4%) and non-whites (7.7%). Bargaining
behavior appears to account for much of the persistence of residual wage gaps.
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Keywords: Gender wage gap; salary history ban; labor discrimination, wage
inequality, wage bargaining

†

Corresponding author, Technology & Policy Research Initiative, Boston University. Address: 765
Commonwealth Ave, Suite 904, Boston, MA, 02215, USA. Tel: 207-607-1334 Email: jbessen@gmail.com.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628729

1. Introduction
Economists have long argued that workers can sometimes escape
discrimination by switching jobs (Becker 1971). If a worker is paid below her
marginal productivity because her employer discriminates, she can switch to an
employer who does not discriminate and thus earn a fair market wage. However,
this mechanism might not work if employers can often gain access to job
applicants’ previous pay histories. Salary history signals the applicant’s
reservation wage possibly giving the employer a bargaining advantage—job
applicants currently suffering from discrimination or other disadvantages may be
willing to accept a lower wage offer than other workers with comparable
capabilities. Because employers who negotiate with job applicants over pay—as
opposed to posting the wage—gain a bargaining advantage from salary history,
this information may help perpetuate pre-existing inequities.
Aware of this possibility and frustrated by the stubborn persistence of
gender pay gaps, women’s advocates have pushed for salary history ban (SHB)
legislation that forbids employers from asking for salary histories. Since August
2016, when Massachusetts passed such a law, more than a dozen states and cities
have enacted SHB laws or regulations covering private employers (see Table I).
The solid line in Figure I shows that nearly a quarter of private-sector workers in
the US are now covered by an SHB. It also appears that the SHB may have
substantially altered employer behavior. The dashed line shows the share of
online help-wanted advertisements that list salary information. That share roughly
tripled following the first SHB laws, suggesting that this natural economic
experiment might reveal important information about bargaining and wage
setting.
This paper explores the relationships between salary history bans and
employer behavior regarding wage posting and pay for job changers including,
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specifically, for women and minorities. We estimate these effects using a
differences-in-differences design estimating pay for job changers in treated
compared to control states before and after bans were implemented. We further
explore differences between demographic groups and we conduct placebo tests
and other robustness checks to support identification.
This analysis is important because SHB-related changes in bargaining
behavior might reveal the extent to which gender or racial wage gaps are affected
by bargaining rather than being the result of productivity-related worker
characteristics. Research shows that wage gaps have narrowed in recent decades,
especially as human capital differences between groups have been reduced or
eliminated.1 But it is unclear how much of the residual pay gaps—the pay gaps
remaining after controlling for observable worker characteristics—are attributable
to unobserved worker characteristics that differ by group. Our findings imply that
a large portion of these wage gaps is not related to productivity differences
between workers.
A number of studies have sought to evaluate the effect of SHBs as a policy
intended to reduce the gender wage gap (Sinha 2019; Hansen and McNichols
2020; Sran, Vetter, and Walsh 2020). This paper does not attempt such a policy
evaluation. Instead, utilizing the natural experiment, we are able to glean
important insights about pay inequities, from both the changes in wage posting
behavior of employers in job openings and in the actual equilibrium wages. 2
We begin with a simple model adapted from Hall and Krueger (2010). In
this model, the reservation wage of a job applicant could be less than her marginal
productivity for a number of reasons such as search frictions (Burdett and

1

See, for example, Blau and Kahn (2017)
Our analysis also suggests that it may be too early to properly evaluate the salary history ban as a policy
instrument. Although the evidence shows significant impacts on wages, both employer and worker behavior
are likely to change over a period of years in reaction to these wage changes.
2
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Mortensen 1998), monopsony, labor market conditions (Mask 2020), or
discrimination. Salary history information reveals the applicant’s reservation
wage. As long as the employer has not previously advertised a salary, the
employer can make an offer at this level (or slightly higher) and the applicant will
accept. Our model predicts that a salary history ban removes this bargaining
advantage, causing: 1) more firms to post wages, 2) increased wages for job
changers, and 3) greater wage increases for those workers with the lowest
reservation wages. To the extent that certain groups have historically been
disadvantaged due to discrimination, these groups will see greater wage gains for
job changers.
Our empirical strategy is informed by our model and, in this way, differs
from other research on SHBs in several ways. First, Sinha (2019) and Hansen and
McNichols (2020) study the impact of SHBs on the gender wage gap. Our model
suggests that although the intent of the legislation in most states might have been
to improve gender pay equity, the SHB should have effects on some male workers
who have low reservation wages. We find evidence of positive wage effects on
female workers, but also on non-white male workers and, to a lesser degree, on
white male workers who changed jobs.
Second, the model implies that wage effects should apply only to job
changers, not to incumbent workers.3 There are two problems with including
incumbent workers in the sample: they dilute the estimates of the treatment effect
and they obscure identification. The latter problem arises because passage of SHB
legislation is likely endogenous—it may well reflect rising concern within a state

3

Hansen and McNichols (2020) find that most of their measured effects arise from job changers. Sran et al.
(2020) look at job changers, but they include salary history bans that cover public employees only, obscuring
identification for private employees. The evidence from the paper is also based on the aggregated Quarterly
Workforce Indicators data only. Sinha (2019) does not distinguish between incumbents or job changers.
Additionally, Hansen and McNichols (2020) and Sinha (2019) do not provide further evidence from
employers’ changing hiring behavior.
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about gender pay inequity. But that rising concern might also influence employers
to increase the relative pay of incumbent women workers independently of a
salary history ban. In this case, measuring the treatment on a pooled sample that
includes incumbent workers conflates the treatment effect of an SHB with rising
general concern about gender pay inequity. We resolve this identification problem
in two ways that the other papers do not. First, we measure the net treatment
effect on job changers relative to the change in pay for incumbent workers. We
do, in fact, find a small but significant increase in the pay of female incumbent
workers and a much larger increase for female job changers. Second, we select a
comparison group that is likely to have similar general concerns about pay
inequities. In particular, we choose controls that are in the same commuting zones
as treated workers but across state boundaries.
We find empirical support for each of the main predictions of our model.
First, looking at online help-wanted ads, we find a significant rise in the
probability that the ads list salary information after SHBs go into effect. Second,
we estimate that after an SHB, job-changing workers earn 4% more than
comparable job-changers not under SHBs relative to incumbent workers on
average. Third, we find even larger increases in the pay of job-changing women
(6.4%) and non-whites (7.7%). For these previously disadvantaged groups, the
pay increases following an SHB represent a sizeable portion of the residual wage
gap measured for job-changing employees, suggesting that most of this gap is
related to bargaining differences rather than productivity differences between
workers.
Finally, we explore possible secondary effects of the bans. Because SHBs
might reduce employer information about worker productivity and consequently
produce poor matches, we test whether SHBs affect worker turnover. We find that
SHBs do not affect either the rate at which workers change jobs or the
characteristics of those workers who switch, suggesting that SHBs do not harm
5
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the quality of job matches. We also test whether employers shift hiring to nonSHB states.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we develop a model of
firms’ choice between posting wages and bargaining, drawing out the
implications for wages. Second, we test the predictions of this model on wages
with a robust empirical design using a carefully selected control group, drawing
conclusions on the effects on several possible disadvantaged job changer groups
by gender and race. Third, we also explore possible non-wage impacts of SHBs
including wage posting behavior, firm job advertising rates, and worker rates of
changing jobs. These factors might limit the policy effectiveness of salary history
bans. Regardless of policy efficacy, our study reveals a mechanism that plays a
significant role in perpetuating pay inequities.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional
background and review the literature on pay gaps and salary history bans. In
Section 3, we develop a simple wage formation model. In Section 4 we describe
our data and empirical estimation, while the results are presented in Section 5.
And in Section 6 we conclude.

2. Background
Over the past few decades, the gap between men’s and women’s wages
has been shrinking, especially as human capital differences have disappeared
(Blau and Kahn 2017; Goldin 2006; Goldin 2014). Nevertheless, a gap has
persisted that is not easily explained by observable worker characteristics.
Advocates for the bans argue that the use of salary histories contributes to these
persistent gaps.
Salary history bans vary from state to state. Some states explicitly allow
for applicants to voluntarily reveal salary history, while others allow for
employers to ask for salary history once an employment offer with a proposed
6
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salary has been made. The SHB regulations do not mean that an employer never
learns of an applicant’s past salary but can only learn of salary history after they
have made an employment offer or if an applicant offers their history
unprompted. The bans do not prevent employers from asking for a “desired”
salary. SHBs may cover all employers in a state or only public employers.
Nevertheless, all of the bans restrict the information available to employers prior
to reaching a bargain.
A related literature looks at other ways information affects wage setting,
particularly regarding pay transparency (Mas 2014; Baker et al. 2019; Bennedsen
et al. 2019; Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson 2019). But SHBs raise concern about
possible adverse information economies. Meli and Spindler (2019) contend that
salary history conveys important information about a worker’s productivity. In
their model, high-earning women can be hurt by the loss of salary history and the
policy might even increase the gender wage gap, Moreover, reduced information
to prospective employers might induce adverse selection so only low productivity
workers change jobs (Greenwald 1986; Sran, Vetter, and Walsh 2020). We look
for evidence of productivity and selection effects below.
Our paper also relates to a literature on wage posting and bargaining
discussed in the next section.

4

3. A simple model
We wish to set out a model that explains why a salary history ban might
motivate some employers to switch from wage bargaining to posting and draw out
the implications of that model for wage levels. Several papers have explored
differences between occupations, finding that wages tend to be bargained more

4

This literature includes Brenzel, Gartner, and Schnabel (2014), Brenčič (2012), Ellingsen and Rosén
(2003a), and Michelacci and Suarez (2006).
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frequently in occupations for more educated workers, presumably because these
workers have more heterogeneous tasks and skills (Brenčič 2012; Brenzel,
Gartner, and Schnabel 2014; Ellingsen and Rosén 2003b; Hall and Krueger 2010;
2012). But these differences are likely orthogonal to changes over salary history
bans. Indeed, we find changes in job posting behavior across all major
occupational categories. We abstract away from occupational differences by
constructing a model for a single occupation. Below, as a check, we find evidence
that SHBs do not significantly change the occupational composition of our
sample.
We build on the insights of Hall and Krueger (2010) who develop a
straightforward model to explain why some employers post wages for jobs while
others choose to bargain individually with workers. The key result of their model
is that employers will choose to bargain rather than to post wages when the wage
elasticity of labor supply exceeds a certain threshold; they will post wages for
elasticities below this threshold. We adapt this model to consider salary history
bans. An SHB reduces the bargaining power of employers, increasing the postingbargaining threshold, thus raising the share of jobs with posted salaries.
Hall and Krueger assume, without a significant loss of generality, that
labor supply curves have constant wage elasticities. This assumption implies a
specific underlying distribution of reservation wages. Specifically, for each job
opening, j, in a particular occupation for a particular employer in a particular
labor market, the available job applicants differ only in that they have different
reservation wages. For the applicants to job j, the ith worker’s reservation wage,
𝑧! , is drawn from a distribution as
𝑧! ~𝑅(𝑧) = 𝑧 "! ,

𝑧 ∈ [0,1], 𝜓# ≥ 0.

(1)

We assume that job seekers encounter employers randomly and one at a time.
This makes 𝜓# the wage elasticity of the labor supply for job j. 𝑅(𝑧; 𝜓# ) is a

8
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family of distributions/labor supply curves and there is some distribution of
elasticities over jobs. This setup corresponds to notions of labor supply elasticity
in what Alan Manning (2021) calls “New Classical Monopsony” models such as
the model of Card et al. (2018). In labor markets where employers have been
competing intensely, we would expect reservation wages to be highly similar in
equilibrium. This corresponds to a high elasticity of labor supply, 𝜓# , where the
reservation wages are clustered around 1. We further assume that all workers,
regardless of their reservation wages, have the same productivity, p.
The employer first decides whether to post a wage or to advertise without
listing a wage, leading to bargaining. First, consider wage posting. Prior to
encountering an applicant, the employer posts a wage, w. The employer does not
know the applicant’s reservation wage but does know the distribution, R. The
employer’s expected profit per worker is then
(𝑝 − 𝑤)𝑅(𝑤).

(2)

The employer chooses a wage that maximizes this ex ante expected profit
(temporarily suppressing the subscript on 𝜓),
𝑤$ =

𝜓
𝑝.
𝜓+1

where this is the standard monopsony wage and

(3)
"
"%&

is the wage markdown. This

wage yields expected profit
"%&

𝑤$
𝜋$ =
.
𝜓

(4)

Now consider bargaining. Here, the employer encounters an applicant and,
if the applicant’s reservation wage is less than or equal to their productivity, 𝑧! ≤
𝑝, they bargain. The negotiation can be modeled as a sequential bargaining
process where the parties split the surplus, 𝑝 − 𝑧! , with 𝛾(𝑝 − 𝑧! ) going to the
employer and (1 − 𝛾)(𝑝 − 𝑧! ) going to the applicant, 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1. In the case

9
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where employers know salary history, the negotiation can be thought of as a
sequential bargaining process under complete information (Rubinstein 1982). If,
instead, a salary history ban is in place, then the game becomes one of one-sided
incomplete information (Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983; Fudenberg and Tirole
1991, 400). Following the theoretical literature, we assume that under incomplete
information a bargain might not be reached and, if a bargain is achieved, the
employer’s share of the surplus, 𝛾, is less than it would be under complete
5

information, 0 < 𝛾'() < 𝛾*+'() ≤ 1. The ith worker’s wage, conditional on a
bargain being concluded, is then
𝑤,! = 𝑧! + (1 − 𝛾- )(𝑝 − 𝑧! ),

(5)

𝑘 = 𝑆𝐻𝐵, 𝑛𝑜𝑆𝐻𝐵.

Since the applicant and employer will only reach a bargain if 𝑧! ≤ 𝑝, the ex ante
expected profit is
𝜋, = 𝛾- 𝑅 (𝑝)(𝑝 − 𝑧̅, ),

𝑧̅, ≡ 𝐸 [𝑧|𝑧 ≤ 𝑝] =

𝜓
𝑝 = 𝑤$ .
𝜓+1

(6)

The average wage, conditional on employment, is then
𝑤
I, = 𝑧̅, + (1 − 𝛾- )(𝑝 − 𝑧̅, ) = 𝑤$ + (1 − 𝛾- )J𝑝 − 𝑤$ K.

(7)

Note that this wage is generally higher than the posted wage. Comparing (4) and
(6), the employer offering job j will choose to bargain if
"!

𝜓#
𝛾- > N
O
𝜓# + 1

(8)

.

Solving for 𝜓# , the firm will choose bargaining when
∗

∗(

𝜓# > 𝜓 𝛾),

𝜓∗ "
where 𝜓 𝛾 ) solves 𝛾 = Y ∗
Z .
𝜓 +1
∗(

(9)

5

For simplicity, and without loss of significant generality, we let 𝛾!"# reflect both a probability less than one
that a bargain will be concluded and the lower share going to the employer if a bargain is reached. We could
add an additional parameter to handle these two aspects separately.
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&

otherwise, the firm will post the wage. A solution will exist for 𝛾 > /. Thus, as
long as 𝛾 is not too low, firms will bargain over wages for jobs where the labor
supply is elastic and they will post wages for jobs with inelastic labor supply.

6

The intuition for this result comes from the basic tradeoff between posting and
bargaining: employers obtain lower wages when they post but only when
applicants accept the job. As the labor elasticity of supply gets larger, the
difference between the ex-ante expected wage under posting and bargaining
shrinks to zero, reducing the advantage of posting. However, the probability that
an applicant will accept the posted wage falls. This shifts the employer’s choice to
bargaining at higher elasticities as long as the employer has sufficient bargaining
power. Although we (and Hall and Krueger) developed this result for a specific
family of distributions, the result holds more generally as long as a substantial
portion of workers reject the monopsony wage at high elasticities of supply.
There is some evidence to support this result. First, if labor markets are
tight so that employers compete more intensely (high labor supply elasticity), we
7

might expect less wage posting and vice versa when unemployment is high.

Brenzel, Gartner, and Schnabel (2014) find higher unemployment is associated
with relatively more wage posting, consistent with the model.
We find similarly that wage posting is negatively associated with labor
market tightness (see Appendix Table A7). Second, several papers have used
measures of employer concentration in local labor markets as a proxy for market
power that should be inversely related to the wage elasticity of labor supply (Rinz
2018; Benmelech, Bergman, and Kim 2018; Azar, Marinescu, and Steinbaum

6

As 𝜓 increases asymptotically, the employer profits dwindle to zero for both posting and bargaining but
bargaining remains more profitable in the limit.
7
See also (Ellingsen and Rosén 2003b) and (Depew and Sørensen 2013).
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8

2020; Azar et al. 2020). They find higher employer concentration is associated
with lower wages. We find that employer concentration is also positively
associated with higher wage posting rates (see Appendix Table A7), implying that
salary posting rates are greater for lower wage elasticity jobs.
Because an SHB changes the profitability of bargaining, it affects the
relative profitability of bargaining versus posting, shifting the boundary of jobs
that are posted. We can further distinguish the effect of an SHB on wages across
three ranges of supply elasticities:
a) Post before and after SHB. In this range, 𝜓# < 𝜓 ∗ (𝛾*+'() ), wages remain
unchanged at 𝑤$ .
b) Bargain before, post after SHB. In this range, 𝜓 ∗ (𝛾'() ) > 𝜓# ≥
𝜓 ∗ (𝛾*+'() ), equation (7) implies that the average wage falls by
(1 − 𝛾*+'() )J𝑝 − 𝑤$ K. Note that if 𝛾*+'() ≈ 1, this wage decline will be
negligible. Our results below are consistent with employers having high
bargaining power without an SHB.
c) Bargain before and after SHB. In this range, 𝜓# > 𝜓 ∗ (𝛾'() ), the average
wage rises by (𝛾*+'() − 𝛾'() )J𝑝 − 𝑤$ K.
From this setup, we can draw several implications for our empirical analysis
about what happens when an SHB decreases 𝛾. Assuming that the distribution of
jobs by elasticity remains fixed, a decrease in firm bargaining power with an SHB
means:
"∗

"∗

1. More jobs will be posted with salaries. Since ]"∗ %&^ is decreasing in
𝜓 ∗ , equation (8) means that a decrease in 𝛾 implies an increase in 𝜓 ∗ .

8

Manning (2021, 10) notes that in some search models higher employer concentration could represent a more
competitive market.
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More jobs will then fall into the range where posting is preferred to
bargaining.
2. Average pay of job changers will rise for those jobs that bargain over
wages. If 𝛾*+'() is sufficiently large (close to 1), the average wage of
all new jobs will rise. This is because the decline in wages in group (b)
can be arbitrarily small, while the wages among group (c) jobs
increase.
3. Assuming that the supply elasticity of jobs is uncorrelated with their
productivity, the average posted wage will increase. This is because
the jobs in group (b) have higher supply elasticities hence smaller
markdowns than the jobs in group (a), all else equal.
4. Bargained wages will rise the most for those workers with the lowest
reservation wages. Looking at equation (5), the change in the
bargained wage for individual i is ∆𝑤,! = −(𝑝 − 𝑧! ) ∙ ∆𝛾. This means
that the increase in bargained wages will be greatest for the individuals
with the lowest 𝑧! . To the extent that certain groups suffer from
depressed current wages, those groups should see larger increases in
their wages under a switch to an SHB.
These implications provide hypotheses that can be empirically tested.
However, the model has made some strong assumptions that might not hold
empirically. Critically, the model assumes that the distribution of jobs and the
distribution of reservation wages remain unchanged after an SHB. In the long run,
however, these assumptions are likely to be untenable. If SHBs raise wages, then
multi-state employers might shift their hiring to non-SHB states. If certain groups
of employees particularly benefit from SHBs, these groups might change jobs
more frequently, altering the distribution of reservation wages. Nevertheless,
these effects on the extensive margin might take some time to occur. If so, then
we can make reliable hypothesis tests and also gain lower-bound estimates of the
13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628729

effects of salary history information. Below we conduct tests on the composition
of job changers and on the location of firm hiring to check for shifts along the
extensive margin. We do not find economically significant shifts with only a few
groups being statistically significant, suggesting that our short-run estimates hold
under the model assumptions.
Also, the model assumes that employers know each worker’s marginal
productivity. It is possible, however, that salary histories might convey
information about applicants’ marginal productivities. In that case, a salary
history ban might lead to a greater rate of bad matches, higher job turnover, and
lower productivity. Below we also look for evidence on changes in turnover rates
and productivity. We do not find significant evidence of change, suggesting that
at least in the short run, productivity concerns do not affect our estimates.
Finally, the model assumes that without salary history information,
employers’ bargaining surplus falls from 𝛾*+'() to 𝛾'() . However, for
discriminated groups, employers under an SHB might still practice statistical
discrimination. For example, an employer under an SHB won’t know a woman’s
previous salary but will know that women have been paid less than men on
average. This statistical knowledge might well improve the firm’s bargaining
outcome so that it receives a share of the surplus that falls between 𝛾*+'() and
𝛾'() for female job applicants. This possibility implies that the estimates we
obtain for the impact of SHBs on disadvantaged groups may well be lower bound
estimates of the extent to which salary history information perpetuates inequities
for these groups.

4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Data
Our two main data sources are job advertisements collected by Burning Glass
Technologies (BG), and survey microdata from the Basic Monthly Current
14
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Population Survey (CPS). BG is a software company that scrapes and
9

deduplicates the near-universe of online job advertisements. A previous analysis
of BG shows this dataset accounts for 60-70% of all job openings and 80-90% of
openings requiring a bachelor’s degree or more (Carnevale, Jayasundera, and
Repnikov 2014). BG data includes the advertised wage (if any), firm name,
industry, occupation, required education and experience, requested skills, and
geographic location of the job at the state, county, and metropolitan statistical
area.

10

Our BG sample spans from January 2010 to December 2018. We omit job
advertisements that are missing a firm name, are in the public sector, are part
time, or are internships. Additionally, we require non-missing education and
experience fields. In total, about 41 million postings meet these criteria.

11

The CPS is a monthly survey that is jointly conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the United States Census Bureau. Participants are surveyed
for four months consecutively, drop out of the sample for eight months, and then
are interviewed again for four months. The survey reaches about 60,000
households per month. Our sample contains monthly data from January 2013 to

9

For a detailed discussion of the representativeness of job posting data, see the appendix of Hershbein and
Kahn (2018)
10
We also classify commuting zones based on FIPS county codes, imputing some commuting zones based on
county populations within the state. Firm names are cleaned by Burning Glass, though we cleaned firm
names again, removing common identifiers such as “Inc.” and “Ltd.” and then applying a fuzzy matching
algorithm. Occupations are provided up to 6-digit SOC codes, with better coverage at higher levels of
aggregation. Industries are provided up to the 6-digit NAICS level, with better coverage at higher levels of
aggregation. Advertised salaries are sometimes given as a single number and sometimes a range. We created
three variables from salary advertisements. The first is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a salary
advertisement of any kind. The second is an indicator for if the salary advertisement is given as a range.
Finally, the natural log of average salary was calculated.
11
These 41 million observations do not appear to be systematically different in terms of education or
experience from the observations that do not meet these criteria.
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12

13

February 2020. In addition to a range of worker characteristics, wage, weekly
14

earnings , and hours worked are reported in the outgoing rotation groups, months
4 and 8. Our sample contains 1.1 million observations with wage or earnings data.
However, when we limit the sample to control and treatment groups and look at
demographic subgroups, the effective sample is much smaller. We provide tests
below to demonstrate that these analyses have sufficient statistical power.
Importantly, the CPS asks if respondents are working for a new employer
in months 2-4 and 6-8 in the survey. We use this information to determine
whether workers in the outgoing rotation groups (months 4 and 8) have changed
jobs during the last three months. Approximately 52,000 of our wage observations
15

are for workers who changed employers during the three-month window.

4.2. Control group
In the ideal experiment for our study, we would randomly assign firms to
be under a salary history ban while allowing others to seek salary history. We
could then compare salary posting rates and the wages of job changers between
these two groups. But the actual passage of state SHB laws is not random. Factors
that could have led to SHB laws—such as general concern about the gender wage

12

We further restrict the sample to include only respondents aged to 16-65, full-time workers, and those
working in the private sector.
13
The basic monthly CPS contains demographic information, education, occupation, industry, and job status.
For ease of comparison with the Burning Glass data, Census definitions of occupation and industry were
converted to their Standard Occupation Code (SOC) and North American Industry Classifications System
(NAICS) equivalents, respectively.
14
Earnings in the CPS are top-coded, with different top codes for hourly and annual earnings. Hourly
earnings are top coded at $99.99 for usual hours worked < 29 and $2885.07/hours worked for those with
usual hours worked > 29. Less than 1% of observations are top coded at either weekly or hourly wage levels.
When normalized to annual earnings, 0.67% of observations are top coded. Excluding top-coded observations
does not significantly alter our results.
15

To control for business cycle effects, we also add a measure of labor market tightness by state-month. We
follow Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) in defining labor market tightness as the ratio between Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) statewide openings for the non-farm sector and the state
unemployment rate.
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gap—might also lead employers to adjust women’s wages independently of the
SHB. To assuage concerns about selection into SHB laws and unobserved
heterogeneity, for both data sets, we construct a comparison group that consists of
counties not covered by SHBs, but in the same labor market areas (commuting
zones) as treated counties. Commuting Zones were defined beginning in the
1980s to better delineate labor markets by grouping counties using a hierarchical
16

cluster analysis and the Census Bureau’s “journey to work” data. A county is
more similar to its cross-state counterpart than a randomly chosen one. Appendix
Figure A1 shows an example of a commuting zone consisting of treated and
untreated counties. Adjacent counties likely have similar sentiments regarding the
gender wage gap and other factors possibly related to the passage of SHB laws.
Other studies have taken a similar approach to eliminating selection bias using
adjacent counties or state line boundaries to create control and treatment groups
(see for example, Dube, Lester, and Reich 2010, Card and Krueger 1994). This is
a conservative approach that might understate the measured treatment effects
because labor market competition might cause comparison group firms to post
wages or raise offers to women. In the Appendix, we explore other control group
definitions using synthetic controls with algorithmically defined weights.
Also, not all respondent county codes are reported in the CPS. In the
analysis below, we only include control group observations where county
information is reported. In Appendix Table A5, we explore alternative control
groups where we include non-reporting counties in adjacent states, all
observations in adjacent states, and all non-treated states. These alternative

16

The county groupings of commuting zones are slightly adjusted every 10 years. We selected the
commuting zones defined in 1990 and utilized Dorn’s crosswalk file to map counties to commuting zones
(Autor and Dorn 2013). For more details on the construction of Commuting Zones, see Tolbert and Sizer
(1990).
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control group choices generate higher treatment coefficients than our more
conservative assignment.

5. Results
5.1. Salary posting
We study the propensity to advertise salary using a standard extended
difference-in-difference specification:
𝑃!01 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝟏[𝑡 ≥ 𝜏0 ] ∙ 𝟏[𝑠 ∈ 𝑇] + 𝛿𝑋!01 + 𝜖!01 .

(10)

where 𝑃!01 is 1 if ad i lists salary in state s at time t, and 0 otherwise. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are
17

state and time fixed effects, 𝑋!01 is a vector of controls, and 𝜖!01 is the error term.
𝛾 is the estimate of the treatment effect, treatment occurring when the state
belongs to the set of treated states, T, and the observation occurs after the
effective date of the SHB, 𝜏0 .
The first column in Table II estimates a treatment effect using our
treatment and comparison groups. Errors are clustered by state, the primary unit
18

for the assignment of treatment. The estimate is about 3 percentage points and is
highly significant.
Figure II shows event study coefficients for a comparable regression
19

plotted against the quarter relative to the ban with a 95% confidence interval.

The rate of posting increases sharply the quarter after the ban goes into effect.

17

The controls include labor market tightness, experience required (and squared experience), education
required, county, firm, and occupation.
18
Seven counties in New York state enacted SHBs prior to the statewide ban for all employees. These
represent only 1% of the observed treated workers.
19

The coefficients 𝛾$%& are obtained from regressing a dummy variable for posting, P,
𝑃'($ = 𝛼( + 𝛽$ + ∑ $%& 𝛾$%& ∙ 𝟏(𝑡 ≥ 𝜏( ) ∙ 𝟏(s ∈ T) + 𝛿𝑋'($ + 𝜖'($ where 𝜏( is the quarter when the ban
$%&)%*

went into effect and X are control variables. The coefficients are omitted for the first quarter observed in the
data and for the quarter immediately before the ban.
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There are no significant pre-event trends, although perhaps a slight negative
anticipation effect can be seen the quarter before the ban. This implies that wage
posting rates for the control group were not trending differently from the
treatment group prior to the bans. This provides support for the assumption that
wage posting rates for treatment and control group trend in parallel, making the
control group a plausible counterfactual.
We also support our identification by using two placebo tests. First, in
several states, the SHBs that were enacted only covered government jobs. If our
measured treatment effect were driven by general concerns about the gender wage
gap, a “zeitgeist effect”, then we should see a change in job posting by private
employers following a state ban on salary histories for public sector employers.
Column 2 of Table II shows results for control and treatment groups selected for
public SHBs. It shows no such effect. Second, if such factors were behind our
result, then we would expect to see an increase in job posting after the salary
20

history bans were enacted but before they came into effect. Column 3 repeats the
regression of column 1, adding a treatment effect after the SHB was enacted but
before it came into effect. The enacted date effect is actually negative and
statistically significant, consistent with the anticipation effect seen in the event
study. These tests address concerns about policy endogeneity and spillovers from
public sector SHBs.

21

Although we find an economically significant treatment effect of around 3
percentage points in our baseline estimation, this is quite a bit smaller than the
nearly 25 percentage point jump in salary posting rates seen in Figure I. This may

20

The mean lag from enactment to effect is 205 days in our sample.
Aside from the shown placebo tests, we also performed a separate endogeneity check using the first- and
second-order residual gender wage gap and measures of state political ideology (constructed by Richard
Fording) as predictors for a state adopting the SHB. The coefficients are not statistically or economically
significant.
21
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stem from our attempt to measure the direct effect of the SHB on job posting in
the affected states using a conservatively selected control group. However, there
may be a substantial indirect or contamination effect as well. That is, employers
not subject to the ban might nevertheless change their hiring behavior because of
changing attitudes. For example, the enactment of SHBs in some states may have
encouraged human resource professionals to voluntarily avoid the use of salary
histories or to switch to job posting. Or multi-state firms may change policies
company-wide after encountering an SHB in one state. In the Appendix, we show
results from using different control groups with synthetic control analyses of
California’s SHB. These support the notion of a substantial indirect effect of
SHBs on job posting.
Finally, columns 4 and 5 of Table II explore whether the SHB changed the
salaries advertised conditional on being posted. Consistent with the model, the
SHB is associated with a small but statistically insignificant increase in the
average log salary posted (column 4) and no change in the size of the range of
22

salaries posted (column 5). While employers may change their behavior in terms
of posting wages, it does not appear that they adjust the characteristics of posted
wages.

5.2. Pay of job-changers
In our model, changes in bargaining power both induce firms to post
salaries for more jobs and to pay higher wages for job changers. To the extent that
such differences in bargaining power drive differences in posting rates across
states, we should expect states with higher posting rates to also pay job changers
more. Using our sample of matched counties, Column (1) of Table III

22

The dependent variable is the maximum salary advertised minus the minimum divided by the minimum.
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demonstrates a significant positive association between log annual earning of job
23

changers with the monthly share of job ads that post salary information per state.
We can see the impact of an SHB in a crude way by looking at the

unconditional change in wage realized by workers who change jobs. For a subset
of the CPS outgoing rotation groups, we observe the hourly wages of workers
who have changed employers during the last three months and we can also
observe their hourly wages a year earlier. We calculate that for job changers not
under an SHB, the unconditional mean hourly wage is 3.9% higher than the yearearlier wage, but for job changers under an SHB, the increase is 7.9%. This
difference, 4%, is large and statistically significant.

24

It is possible that SHB states tended to have some other factor that
affected earnings. We can further control for such possible trends using a
difference-in-differences-in-differences design (DDD). Since we assume that the
SHB affects the pay of job changers but not of incumbent workers,
𝑌!01 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝟏[𝑖 ∈ 𝑁] ∙ 𝟏[𝑡 ≥ 𝜏0 ] ∙ 𝟏[𝑠 ∈ 𝑇] + 𝛿𝑋!01 + 𝐼 + 𝜖!01
𝐼 = 𝜇 ∙ 𝟏[𝑡 ≥ 𝜏0 ] ∙ 𝟏[𝑠 ∈ 𝑇] + 𝜌 ∙ 𝟏[𝑖 ∈ 𝑁].

(11)

where 𝑌!01 is log annual earnings for individual i in state s at time t. Here, the
treatment effect is estimated for workers belonging to the set of job changers, N,
in SHB states, after the effective date of the SHB. We include other interaction
25

terms to capture baseline effects for job changers and treated workers. This
regression is run on the full outgoing rotation group sample and is shown in
Column 2. The estimated treatment effect is larger (8.0%) and there does seem to

23

All regressions include controls for experience, experience squared, education, union coverage, marital
status x gender, child in household, industry, county, occupation, month and year.
24
The probability value of a t-test is .035.
25
The third level of difference here between job changers and incumbents intends to take away contamination
in the treated states coming from general concerns of pay equality that affect both two groups independently
of the bans.
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be a significant positive effect among incumbent workers (4.3%), which may
26

come from the general concerns on equality in the treated states. If we subtract
the coefficient on incumbents from the coefficient on job changer, we obtain a net
effect of 3.8% for the increase in annual earnings for job changers solely coming
from SHBs. Column (3) repeats the estimation on county pairs only, which
provide an additional level of control. The treatment effect for incumbent workers
is smaller and only marginally significant, but the net effect is very similar to that
of the full sample. Figure III reports the event study charts corresponding to this
regression. Once again, there do not appear to be significant pre-trends but a
significant increase in pay following an SHB. Column (4) repeats the regression
of column (3), but with log hourly wage as the dependent variable. We have a
very similar estimate of the treatment effect and net effect.
One concern is that these estimates might be biased if the composition of
job switchers changes under an SHB. For instance, Meli and Spindler (2019)
argue that highly paid women will be less likely to change jobs under an SHB.
We further explored whether changes in the composition of job changers might
affect our results. We compared the year-earlier pay of workers who changed jobs
in months 6 to 8 of the survey depending on whether the worker was covered by
an SHB or not. Calculating Mincer-type residuals for the earlier year, job
changers under an SHB tended to come from jobs with slightly higher pay on
average, contrary to Meli and Spindler. However, the difference was small and
27

not statistically significant. Consistent with the model, workers who earned
relatively more in their previous job benefit less from an SHB than do lower paid

26

The regression also includes non-interacted dummy variables for incumbents and job changers (not
shown).
27
The Mincer equation controlled for experience, experience squared, union membership, part time status,
marital status x gender, motherhood, county, occupation, industry, education, month and year. The difference
in the log residual was .023 (.026).
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28

workers. This implies that our estimates of the treatment effect on pay are
slightly smaller than they would be otherwise because of this small shift in the
composition of job changers.
The above estimates stand up to a variety of robustness checks (see
Appendix). To correct for possible state-specific trends, Table A2, column 1
shows an estimation with state-by-year fixed effects. Column 2 explores whether
the effect is consistent across different states, here grouped by cohort of the dates
the SHB went into effect. This is important because California represents over
half of the treated observations. If anything, the treatment effect appears to grow
larger over time. Also, Table A4 reports estimates of Table III using Coarsened
Exact Matching to balance the characteristics of the treatment and control groups.
Finally, we also test our findings on an alternative dataset, the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators from the Census (see also Sran et al. (2020)). Although this
is aggregate data, it can be obtained for a sufficient number of cells to run our
basic difference-in-differences regression using our treatment and control
counties. In Table A8 in the Appendix, we find an SHB treatment effect of 3.0%
for job changers.
Is the size of our treatment effect implausibly large? Previous studies have
found big changes in pay when relevant information is revealed for university
faculty and CEOs (Mas 2016; Baker et al. 2019). More directly comparable,
Barach and Horton (2020) conduct a field experiment and find an even greater
difference, 9%, when salary history is suppressed. Moreover, our estimated
treatment effect should be thought of as a lower bound to the Local Average
Treatment Effect because it is an Intent to Treat. Not all prospective applicants
choose to keep their salary histories private; some voluntarily reveal their

28

Job changers with above-median Mincer residuals saw their pay change by -.025 (.020); job changers with
below median residuals saw their pay change .107 (.015).
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histories thus providing employers with a bargaining advantage. Agan et al.
(2020) survey 504 Americans in the labor force and find that 58% of them are
“compliers” of the SHB regardless of the firm’s behavior. This suggests that the
Local Average Treatment Effect is larger than the estimates shown in Table III.

29

5.3. Gender and Minority Groups
The model suggests that individuals with low reservation wages should
see the greatest pay gains from a salary history ban. Consequently, groups of
individuals who might have experienced discrimination or other disadvantages
should see gains. Table IV explores the relationship between SHBs and wages for
several groups. It again uses the DDD specifications for workers of different
groups possibly subject to discrimination, distinguishing between job-changing
and incumbent workers as well as selecting a control group highly similar to the
treatment group.
In the first column of Panel A, we see that job-changing women earn 9.9%
more under an SHB. Job-changing men also earn significantly more (3.5%),
suggesting that SHBs reach beyond gender inequities, as our model suggests.
SHBs also have a significant effect on the pay of incumbent women, consistent
with a general concern about gender equity affecting incumbents; there is not a
significant effect on the pay of incumbent men. As above, the difference between
the coefficient on female job changers and the coefficient on female incumbents
demonstrates a 6.4% net effect of SHBs. We can compare this to the residual
wage gap for female job changers. From the baseline effects in the table, female
job changers earn 14.3% less than male job changers on average, after taking
observables into account. This implies that on net, SHBs reduce the gender wage

29

Dividing our reduced form estimates by 0.58, job changers under SHB thus see a 7.9% increase in hourly
wages and 6.9% increase in annualized salary.
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2.4

gap for female job changers by &4.5 = 45%. That is, almost half of the residual
gender wage gap is accounted for by differences in bargaining behavior under
SHBs. The bottom row of each panel lists this ratio for each group. To ensure that
a general concern about gender inequity is not driving these changes, we run a
placebo test in column 2. Here, the events studied are SHBs that cover only public
employees. Presumably concerns about gender equity have promoted the passage
of these SHBs, but they do not cover the workers in our sample at private
employers. The effects of these placebo events are not significant either
economically or statistically, suggesting that our results are not driven by a
general concern about gender inequity.
The model implies that some male job changers should see pay gains
following an SHB, including workers in possibly disadvantaged groups. Panel B
explores treatment effects for non-white workers of both genders (column 3) and
for non-white male workers separately (column 4). Non-whites job changers earn
substantially more after an SHB, seeing a 12.7% increase in wages. But there is a
significant 4.9% increase in pay for incumbent non-whites, suggesting a general
concern about racial pay inequities that might be correlated with the SHB events.
After subtracting this background effect, the net effect of an SHB is a 7.7%
increase for non-white workers. Column (4) repeats the exercise, but only for
male workers. Non-white male job changers experience an 11% increase in wages
relative to white male job changers with a 6.3% net effect. These net effects are
highly significant, and they account for a substantial share of the residual pay
gaps. These findings suggest that these groups might, indeed, be disadvantaged,
30

perhaps because of discrimination.

30

Although salary history bans may have been intended primarily to benefit women, they appear to play a
substantial and positive role for other disadvantaged groups, consistent with our model.
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One possible concern with these estimates is that the sample size of job
changers for the observed groups might be too small to provide reliable statistical
estimates. In the Appendix (Table A10), we conduct power tests finding sufficient
31

statistical power for the sub-samples analyzed in Table IV. In addition, Table A8
shows results using the QWI which generate similar effect sizes for women and
Black workers (compared to non-white workers).
Finally, these estimates of treatment effects might be understated because
of statistical discrimination. If employers do not know salary histories under an
SHB, they might infer previous salaries by the applicant’s identity, for example,
32

making lower offers to female or non-white applicants. To the extent that such
statistical discrimination occurs, our estimates of treatment effects for these
groups understate the true level of inequality perpetuated by the use of salary
histories.

5.4. Changes on the Extensive Margin
Our estimates are based on a model that assumes a stable distribution of
jobs and of job applicants. But given real wage effects, some workers might be
more likely to change jobs than others and some employers might shift their
hiring to states without salary history bans. Also, to the extent that salary history
reveals information about the applicant’s productivity, firms might make better
matches if they knew the applicant’s salary history. Poorer quality matches under
an SHB could lead to higher worker turnover that causes lower productivity.
These secondary effects might confound our estimates or lead to possible adverse

31

Subsamples looking at Black and Hispanic workers, have less statistical power, hence we excluded them.
Such behavior would violate the Equal Pay Act. There is, however, some evidence that “ban the box”
legislation, which suppresses employer access to information on felony convictions or credit checks,
increased statistical discrimination against minorities (A. Agan and Starr 2018; Doleac and Hansen 2020;
Bartik and Nelson 2019).
32
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effects. (Greenwald 1986; Meli and Spindler 2019; Sran, Vetter, and Walsh
2020).
Above we found that higher paid workers were slightly more likely to
change jobs, although this difference was not statistically significant. Table V
provides additional evidence that SHBs appear to have little effect on job turnover
or on the composition of job changers. The table reports the rate of job switching
for the control and treatment groups overall and for subgroups. The third column
reports the difference with standard error. Overall, turnover is slightly less in the
treatment group at a weakly significant level. Nor does the composition of job
changers appear to change substantially for the various subgroups shown.

33

As a robustness check we also tested employee turnover using the QWI
(see Appendix Table A9), finding no significant overall effect and statistically
significant but economically small increase in turnover for women. These
findings suggest that SHBs do not result in higher job turnover arising from
poorer matches. Nor do we find evidence of a change in productivity. In
Appendix Table A2, column 3, we treat state GDP per worker in a DID regression
with year and state fixed effects. Labor productivity does not seem to change with
an SHB. One possibility is that under an SHB, employers substitute other sources
of information about worker productivity. We tested whether SHBs are associated
with higher skill requirements listed in the ads (see Appendix Table A6). We find
that SHBs are associated with higher levels of education required, experience
required, and the number of skills required, although the coefficients are not large.
Information about these specific skill measures appears to at least partially
substitute for salary history information.

33

More specifically, the t-test result for the overall sample in row 1 is significant at 10% level, result for
services & healthcare support occupation is significant at 5% level, and result for 31-49 age group is
significant at 1% level. For the other groups, the differences are not significant.
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We also tested the possibility that firms, faced with higher labor costs
under an SHB, might choose to switch their hiring to non-SHB states. Table A3 in
the Appendix shows difference-in-differences regressions of the log of the
number of online help-wanted ads over states by month. Column 1 reports the
results for just ads of multi-state firms; Column 2 reports for all firms. Instead, of
decreasing, help-wanted ads appear to rise slightly under an SHB although the
effect is not statistically significant.
All told, in our data salary history bans do not appear to be associated with
substantial changes in job turnover, the composition of the workforce, or labor
market demand. These factors do not appear to bias our estimates of treatment
effects. However, it is quite possible that there have not been significant effects
on the extensive margin because our time window post-SHB is short, just a year
or two. Larger changes along the extensive margin may occur in the future. This
means that although we can draw robust conclusions about the role of salary
histories in wage setting and bargaining, the impact of SHBs as a policy
instrument may well require additional years of evidence to properly evaluate.

6. Conclusion
Salary histories reveal information about job applicants’ reservation wages
to employers, giving employers a bargaining advantage. Correspondingly, salary
history bans reveal evidence about the frequency with which employers have
exploited this information and the magnitude of the advantage it provided them.
Our evidence suggests that this advantage has been an important factor
perpetuating wage inequality, especially for women and non-whites.
We find that following SHBs, employers increase the rate at which they
post salaries in online help wanted ads. This suggests that SHBs remove a benefit
of wage bargaining, inducing some firms to post wages instead. The national
share of online help wanted ads listing salary information increased by around a
28
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quarter of all ads following the introduction of SHBs in a dozen states. Since
employers in other states were not under direct pressure to avoid using salary
histories and since not all employers under SHBs would switch to advertising
salaries, this suggests that, as a lower bound, a quarter of employers might have
exploited salary history information.
And the implied benefit to employees is large. The wages of job-changing
workers subject to SHBs rose 3.9% on average compared to equivalent job
changers in other states. Apparently, workers who have had low reservation
wages earn relatively more when they switch jobs under a salary history ban and
less when they switch without one.
Also, we find particularly strong effects of SHBs on groups subject to
historical discrimination. Workers’ pay—and hence their current reservation
wages—can be less than their marginal productivity for a variety of reasons,
including search frictions, different bargaining capabilities, monopsony power,
and discrimination. But groups historically subject to discrimination appear to be
particularly affected by pay inequities. Following SHBs, the pay of job-changing
women rose about 6.4% and the pay of job-changing non-whites rose about 7.7%
on average compared to control group job changers, after netting out general
changes in pay.
Moreover, the estimated treatment effect of SHBs for these groups is large
compared to the residual wage gaps that remain after controlling for observable
characteristics. Over the last decades, average wage differences between men and
women or between non-whites and whites have narrowed as education and
experience differences have shrunk or even been reversed. However, persistent
pay gaps still remain, and it is unclear whether these are due to discrimination, to
unobserved differences in worker characteristics that affect their productivity, or
to something else. Our analysis suggests that at least half of the residual wage gap
for job-changing women disappears under an SHB, implying that at least half of
29
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the residual gender wage gap cannot be attributed to differences in worker
productivity. The bargaining process appears to account for an even larger share
of the residual wage gap for non-whites.
The differences erased by SHBs are not necessarily caused by individual
discrimination—for instance, they might reflect group differences in negotiating
propensity. But salary histories enable a form of institutional discrimination. Even
if employers do not individually discriminate, the use of salary histories appears
to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination or other group inequities.
The large effects we estimate might seem surprising because the salary
history ban is a rather mild restrictive policy. For instance, as previously noted,
SHBs do not prevent employers from asking applicants their desired salary nor do
they prevent applicants from volunteering past salary history (Agan, Cowgill, and
Gee 2020). Perhaps the impact of SHBs despite these limitations speaks to the
depth of pay inequities that are unrelated to productivity. In any case, the effect
size compares well with experimental evidence (Barach and Horton 2020).
As a policy directed to address pay inequities, salary history bans appear
to have had a positive effect in our sample. However, our effects are limited to a
short time window and adverse effects might develop over a longer time period.
Nor do our data speak to workers’ wage trajectories after they are hired or about
the effectiveness of this policy in a less-than-booming economy. While the overall
effectiveness of salary history bans at correcting pay inequities appears to be
promising, definitive conclusions await further research. Nevertheless, we have
identified a major mechanism that appears to perpetuate inequality and our
analysis implies that the persistent pay gaps remaining for women and non-whites
are not mainly about unmeasured productivity differences. Our results make clear
that informational concerns may be key to designing more equitable policies.
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8. Tables
Table I. Statewide Salary History Bans

State

Passed

Effective

Employers
Covered

Massachusetts

8/1/16

7/1/18

All

Gender

New York

1/9/17

1/9/17

Public Only

Gender

Puerto Rico

3/8/17

3/8/17

All

Gender

Oregon

5/22/17

10/6/17

All

Protected Classes

Delaware

6/14/17

12/14/17

All

Gender

California
District of
Columbia

10/12/17

1/1/18

All

None

11/17/17

11/17/17

Public Only

None

New Jersey

1/16/18

2/1/18

Public Only

Gender

Hawaii

1/19/18

1/1/19

All

Gender

Vermont

5/11/18

7/1/18

All

None

Connecticut

5/22/18

1/1/19

All

None

Pennsylvania

6/6/18

9/4/18

Public Only

New Jersey

1/14/19

1/1/20

All

Illinois

1/15/19

1/15/19

Public Only

Gender

North Carolina

4/2/19

4/2/19

Public Only

Gender

Maine

4/12/19

9/17/19

All

Gender

Washington

4/25/19

7/28/19

All

Gender

Colorado

5/22/19

1/1/21

All

Gender

Alabama

5/30/19

9/1/19

All

Race, Gender

New York

6/15/19

1/6/20

All

None

Virginia

6/20/19

7/1/19

Public Only

Groups Mentioned

Gender
None

None
Gender, "Other Protected
Illinois
7/31/19
9/29/19
All
Characteristics"
Note: This table shows the states with salary history bans. Our main analysis only includes SHBs
that cover private employers. In addition to these statewide bans, New York City instituted a ban
on 10/31/2017, and in New York State bans were put in effect by Albany County 12/31/2017,
Westchester County 7/9/2018, and Suffolk County 6/30/2019.
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Table II. The Effect of Salary History Ban on Firm Salary Posting
Dependent variable = 1 if help wanted ad contains salary information, 0 otherwise.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Post-SHB
Enacted Date

(5)

Base

Public SHB
Placebo Test

Enacted Date
Placebo Test

Mean Ln
Salary

Salary Range
(pct)

0.027
(0.009)

-0.004
(0.003)

0.025
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.003)

0.010
(0.007)

0.001
(0.006)

Observations
17,530,375
5,490,708
17,530,375
1,486,575
1,486,575
R-squared
0.449
0.408
0.449
0.676
0.429
Note: This table shows the extended Diff-in-Diff (DD) results of the effect of SHBs on firms’
salary posting and salary offered. The data are from the near universe job board microdata in US
compiled by Burning Glass Technologies. Errors are clustered by state in parentheses. Sample
include online help wanted ads for counties that are eventually treated and for control counties and
excludes ads for interns, part-time jobs, public sector employers and employers where no firm is
listed (likely recruiters). Column 2 has a different sample with treatment and control groups
defined for states with SHBs that cover only public sector employees. All regressions include
controls for labor market tightness, experience required, experience squared, education required,
firm, county, occupation, month and year.
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Table III. Salary History Bans and Pay by Job Changers and Incumbents
Dependent variable (log)
Sample
Treatment effects
Incumbent x State Posting Rate
Job Changer x State Posting Rate

(1)
Annual
Earnings
County Pairs

(2)
Annual
Earnings
Full Sample

(3)
Annual
Earnings
County Pairs

(4)
Hourly Wage

0.043
(0.009)
0.080
(0.010)

0.026
(0.012)
0.065
(0.012)

0.028
(0.012)
0.064
(0.015)

-0.055
(0.008)

-0.033
(0.003)

-0.032
(0.006)

-0.030
(0.006)

313,668
0.554

1,041,923
0.547

337,700
0.553

330,289
0.507

0.242
(0.133)
0.474
(0.140)

Incumbent x Post-SHB
Job Changer x Post-SHB
Baseline
Job Changer

Observations
R-squared

County Pairs

Net effect for job changers

0.232
0.038
0.039
0.036
(0.050)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.005)
Note: Column 1 of this table presents a correlation test of the state salary posting rate and the
annual earnings of individuals. Column 2-4 shows the DDD estimation results of the effect of
SHBs on wages. The net effects are the differences between the coefficients on job changers and
the coefficients on incumbents to control for other factors that affect both groups in the treated
states. The dataset is from the Current Population Survey. Errors are clustered by state in
parentheses. This sample includes private sector employed workers in control and treatment
groups. All regressions include controls for experience, experience squared, education, union
coverage, marital status x gender, child in household, industry, county, occupation, month and
year. Job changers are determined by those in outgoing rotation groups who report that they
changed employers in the previous 3 months. Additionally, the same analysis was run omitting
top-coded salaries in the CPS; results were highly similar.

36

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3628729

Table IV. Salary History Bans and Log Annual Earnings by Groups
Panel A: Male / Female
Sample:
Treatment effects
Male x Incumbent x Post-SHB
Male x Job Changer x Post-SHB
Female x Incumbent x Post-SHB
Female x Job Changer x Post-SHB
Baseline effect (gap)
Female x Job Changer
Observations
R-squared
Net Effect for Female Job Changers
Net Effect / Gap for Job Changers

(1)
All

(2)
Placebo

0.017
(0.011)
0.035
(0.010)
0.035
(0.014)
0.099
(0.019)

0.001
(0.007)
0.039
(0.024)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.020
(0.024)

-0.143
(0.008)
337,700
0.555

-0.154
(0.012)
186,846
0.563

0.064
(0.012)

0.025
(0.024)

45%

16%

(3)
All

(4)
Males Only

0.020
(0.013)
0.045
(0.013)
0.049
(0.012)
0.127
(0.020)

0.012
(0.010)
0.015
(0.010)
0.047
(0.013)
0.110
(0.030)

-0.089
(0.012)
337,700
0.555

-0.109
(0.023)
171,379
0.548

0.077
(0.015)

0.063
(0.023)

87%

58%

Panel B: White / Non-White
Sample:
Treatment effects
White x Incumbent x Post-SHB
White x Job Changer x Post-SHB
Non-White x Incumbent x Post-SHB
Non-White x Job Changer x Post SHB
Baseline effect (gap)
Non-White x Job Changer
Observations
R-squared
Net Effect for Non-White Job Changers
Net Effect / Gap for Job Changers

Note: This table shows the DDD results of SHBs on annual earnings by group. Errors are clustered by state in
parentheses. Sample includes private sector employed workers in control and treatment groups from the
Current Population Survey. Column 2 uses SHB laws that covered only public employees as a placebo
treatment; the other columns use SHB laws covering all employees. Non-white is defined as any respondent
who does not identify as white in the CPS. Job changers are determined by those in outgoing rotation groups
who report that they changed employers in the previous 3 months. All regressions include controls for
experience, experience squared, education, union coverage, marital status x gender, child in household,
industry, county, occupation, month and year. Not shown are baseline effects interacting male/female
(white/non-white) with job-changer/incumbent
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Table V. Changes in job switching rates with and without SHB
Share of workers who have begun a new job during the last 3 months
(1)
(2)
(3)
Control
Group

Treatment
Group

All

0.046

0.044

-0.002 (0.001)

Male

0.046

0.044

-0.002 (0.001)

Female

0.047

0.045

-0.002 (0.001)

Management

0.038

0.042

0.004 (0.003)

Professional

0.043

0.041

-0.002 (0.002)

Services & healthcare support

0.055

0.049

-0.006 (0.003)

Sales

0.047

0.045

-0.002 (0.003)

Office & administrative

0.045

0.042

-0.003 (0.003)

Production, constr., transport

0.049

0.047

-0.002 (0.002)

0.062

0.06

-0.002 (0.002)

Difference

Occupation

Age
15-30
31-49

0.043
0.039
-0.004 (0.002)
50-65
0.036
0.037
0.001 (0.002)
Note: This table reports the comparison of the share of job switchers in the treatment and control
group. The third column report the difference with standard error. Data drawn from the Current
Population Survey. Sample includes private-sector employed workers in control and treatment
groups.
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9. Figures

Figure I
Coverage of Salary History Bans and Online Job Posting
Source: Current Population Survey; Burning Glass

Note: This figure shows share of private-sector workers covered by a salary history ban policy in
the United States and the share of online job advertisements that posted a salary or salary range.
Shortly after the first salary history bans went into effect the share of job ads that posted wages
nearly tripled.
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Figure II
Event study of online salary posting

Note: This figure shows an event study of the probability of posting a salary in an online job
advertisement. Compared to figure I these shares may seem low, but the specification controls for
county, education, experience, experience squared, occupation, and firm name. There may be a
slight anticipation effect in the quarter relative to the ban. All subsequent quarters show a
statistically significant increase in the rate of salary posting.
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Figure III
Event Study of Job Changer Salaries

Note: This event study shows the log annual earnings of job changers from the Current Population Survey.
Job changers are determined by answers to a question asking if the respondent has begun working for a new
employer in survey months 2-4 and 6-8. There is no clear pre-trend in the four quarters leading up to a salary
history ban and a clear and statistically significant increase starting in the quarter following these bans.
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